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NARRATIVE RELEVANCE, IMAGINED JURIES, AND A SUPREME 
COURT INSPIRED AGENDA FOR JURY RESEARCH 
RICHARD O. LEMPERT* 
This paper has its roots in Old Chief v. United States,1 a case the Supreme 
Court of the United States decided in 1997.  I will begin by describing this 
case; then comment on its implications for the Supreme Court’s conception of 
the jury, and conclude by examining the agenda one may draw from it for 
empirical jury research.  Old Chief arose when Johnny Lynn Old Chief was 
charged not only with assault with a dangerous weapon and using a firearm in 
the commission of a crime of violence, but also with violating a law that 
forbids convicted felons from possessing firearms.2  To prove the “felon in 
possession” charge, the government sought to introduce a record of Old 
Chief’s prior felony conviction which disclosed that he had been sentenced to 
five years imprisonment for an unlawful assault that had resulted in serious 
bodily injury.3  Old Chief’s defense was that he never possessed a gun, and he 
offered to stipulate to the fact that he was a convicted felon and so would have 
violated the felon in possession law if the jury found he had possessed a gun. 
It is clear that under the American law of evidence, evidence of Old 
Chief’s prior conviction would have been inadmissible had he been charged 
only on the first two counts and not as a “felon in possession.” The prosecutor 
rejected the stipulation, arguing that he had a right to prove this case with 
whatever relevant evidence he wished.4  The trial judge agreed with the 
prosecutor, and the appellate court affirmed.5  The Supreme Court, in a 5–4 
decision written by Justice Souter, reversed.6  The Court held that, despite the 
broad discretion that Federal Rule 4037 gives trial judges in deciding whether 
to exclude evidence because its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
 
*  Eric Stein Distinguished University Professor of Law and Sociology, The University of 
Michigan.  I would like to thank Craig Callen for the very careful reading he gave this paper and 
for his many useful suggestions for improvement as well as for the help several of his students 
gave me in tracking down citations. 
 1. 519 U.S. 172 (1997). 
 2. Id. at 174. 
 3. Id. at 177. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 178. 
 7. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
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its prejudicial effect, the trial judge could not reasonably have admitted this 
evidence given the availability of the stipulation.8  The Court was correct.  The 
proffered stipulation would have given the jury all the information it would 
have been authorized to draw from evidence of the conviction—specifically 
that Old Chief had been convicted of a felony and would be guilty under the 
statute if he possessed the gun.  The other information that the prosecutor got 
before the jury by presenting the conviction, the nature of the prior offense, 
could only have prejudiced the jury by leading it to believe that Old Chief was 
a violent person. 
While Old Chief marked the first time the Supreme Court limited a trial 
court’s discretion under Federal Rule 403,9 the Court attempted to limit the 
reach of the case, so that parties could not use stipulations to exclude all 
evidence that carried with it substantial prejudicial potential.10  In so doing, the 
Supreme Court recognized a sense in which evidence can be relevant which 
does not fit within the Federal Rule’s core definition of relevant evidence as 
“evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence.”11  Specifically, the Court recognizes as 
relevant evidence which relates to a case and which helps a party tell an 
involving and coherent story.  Justice Souter wrote: 
The “fair and legitimate weight” of conventional evidence showing individual 
thoughts and acts amounting to a crime reflects the fact that making a case 
with testimony and tangible things not only satisfies the formal definition of an 
offense, but tells a colorful story with descriptive richness . . . .  Evidence . . . 
has force beyond any linear scheme of reasoning, and as its pieces come 
together a narrative gains momentum, with power not only to support 
conclusions but to sustain the willingness of jurors to draw the inferences, 
whatever they may be, necessary to reach an honest verdict.  This persuasive 
power of the concrete and particular is often essential to the capacity of jurors 
to satisfy the obligations that the law places on them . . . .  [T]he evidentiary 
account of what a defendant has thought and done can accomplish what no set 
of abstract statements ever could, not just to prove a fact but to establish its 
human significance, and so to implicate the law’s moral underpinnings and a 
juror’s obligation to sit in judgment.  Thus, the prosecution may fairly seek to 
place its evidence before the jurors, as much to tell a story of guiltiness as to 
support an inference of guilt, to convince the jurors that a guilty verdict would 
be morally reasonable as much as to point to the discrete elements of a 
defendant’s legal fault. 
 
 8. 519 U.S. at 191-92. 
 9. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 10. 519 U.S. at 192. 
 11. FED. R. EVID. 401. 
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But there is something even more to the prosecution’s interest in resisting 
efforts to replace the evidence of its choice with admissions and stipulations, 
for . . . there lies the need for evidence in all its particularity to satisfy the 
jurors’ expectations about what proper proof should be.  Some such demands 
they bring with them to the courthouse, assuming, for example, that a charge of 
using a firearm to commit an offense will be proven by introducing a gun in 
evidence.  A prosecutor who fails to produce one, or some good reason for his 
failure, has something to be concerned about . . . .  Expectations may also arise 
in jurors’ minds simply from the experience of a trial itself.  The use of 
witnesses to describe a train of events naturally related can raise the prospect 
of learning about every ingredient of that natural sequence the same way.  If 
suddenly the prosecution presents some occurrence in the series differently, as 
by announcing a stipulation or admission, the effect may be like saying, “never 
mind what’s behind the door,” and jurors may well wonder what they are being 
kept from knowing.  A party seemingly responsible for cloaking something has 
reason for apprehension, and the prosecution with its burden of proof may 
prudently demur at a defense request to interrupt the flow of evidence telling 
the story in the usual way. 
In sum, the accepted rule that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case free 
from any defendant’s option to stipulate the evidence away rests on good 
sense.  A syllogism is not a story, and a naked proposition in a courtroom may 
be no match for the robust evidence that would be used to prove it . . . .  A 
convincing tale can be told with economy, but when economy becomes a break 
in the natural sequence of narrative evidence, an assurance that the missing 
link is really there is never more than second best.12 
I refer to the aspect of relevance Justice Souter describes as narrative 
relevance.  The justification for admitting such evidence, despite the 
possibility that it might inappropriately sway jurors as it engages their 
emotions, is that the evidence is needed to place more factually probative (or 
less prejudicial) evidence in the context of a convincing narrative about what 
happened. 
The first thing to note about the portion of Old Chief I have quoted is the 
image of the jury implicit in Justice Souter’s recognition of narrative 
relevance.  The jury is not, as the Court assumed in the jury size cases, a 
mechanical processor of information whose output, and all that matters, is the 
verdict.  Nor is the jury easily biased or confused, contrary to what one might 
assume from the great discretion recent Supreme Court cases have given trial 
judges to exclude scientific evidence.13  Instead the jury is an active, curious, 
and intelligent processor of information.  The jury is motivated not just by its 
 
 12. 519 U.S. at 187-89. 
 13. See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire, Co. v. 
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
18 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:15 
 
duty to decide a case correctly but also by its interest in learning what 
happened.  The jury recognizes, deals in, and may be persuaded by, nuance.  
Jurors actively create their own stories from the facts provided, and if some 
important item of evidence seems missing or is under-emphasized, they may 
hold this failure against the party responsible for it.  The jury is, not 
unreasonably, suspicious when evidence is provided in strange or unfamiliar 
ways, as by stipulations.  Further, jurors not only wonder about information 
they feel is being withheld, but they may also actively construct explanations 
for gaps in the evidence.  The jury does not merely process facts but also 
considers what is morally reasonable.  Above all, the jury evaluates stories not 
as specific strings of evidence but as gestalts that hang together coherently or 
fail to do so.  Consequently, parties have the right in most cases—albeit not in 
Old Chief itself—to present facts in the context of stories with considerable 
texture. They may introduce material which supplies that texture even when it 
does not fit the Federal Rule’s definition of relevant evidence and has 
substantial potential for prejudice. 
To illustrate what I think Old Chief allows, I believe it is not unfair to read 
the case to say not only that prosecutors ordinarily have a right to show jurors 
bloody pictures of crime scenes, but also that jurors may expect such pictures 
and are likely to see the prosecution’s case as weaker if the prosecution only 
provides them with verbal descriptions of the crime scene.  The prosecution 
suffers not because it is unable to arouse the jury emotionally by showing gore 
but because cognitively the jury suspects that the prosecution did not want 
them to know the full story.  Moreover, the case suggests that there is nothing 
intrinsically wrong with the jurors appreciating the full brutality of the crime 
and that society may benefit if the bloody pictures better enable the jury to 
assess the morality of the crime they are judging.  Yet, the holding in Old Chief 
indicates that jurors ordinarily should not rely on their assessment of a 
defendant’s character to support a conviction without regard to what they know 
of the crime. 
So Old Chief takes us away from an image of the jury, implicit in some 
past cases, as a group of relatively fragile lay decision-makers who may not, 
for example, properly discount hearsay evidence14 and are likely to be 
bamboozled by glib witnesses peddling junk science.15  It offers instead the 
image of a robust decision maker that is actively participating in the 
construction of an account of what occurred.  Old Chief does not deplore the 
 
 14. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 132-33 (1968). 
 15. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (holding 
the trial court should be more willing to use Rule 403 to exclude expert testimony, in light of 
degree to which it may be misleading, than to exclude lay witness testimony) (quoting Jack B. 
Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence Is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 
F.R.D. 631, 632 (1992)). 
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effect of jurors’ emotional and moral perspectives on their efforts to get at the 
truth, a dramatic change from how the influence of emotion on legal fact 
finding is commonly regarded.  Instead, it sees emotional involvement and 
moral judgments as integral to the decisions we expect jurors to make.  Jurors 
in Old Chief become fully human. 
From the perspective of social psychologists studying the jury, there’s also 
much to take from Old Chief.  First, the Court not only recognizes the story 
model of case presentation associated with Lance Bennett and Martha 
Feldman,16 and the story model of jury decision making, which Nancy 
Pennington and Reid Hastie17 introduced about a decade ago, but treats them as 
if they were established truths about what lawyers should do and how juries 
decide cases.  These supposed truths are, of course, empirical propositions. 
While it seems clear that lawyers strive to include evidence in their cases that 
is only narratively relevant (if it is relevant at all), it is less clear how 
narratively relevant evidence affects the jury’s construction of stories.  Hastie 
and Pennington showed that the order in which evidence was presented affects 
the degree to which juries are persuaded by it.18  Evidence presented in story 
order is more persuasive than the same evidence presented in witness order.19  
But we know little about whether a more richly textured and presumably more 
interesting story is more persuasive with juries than a story which has the 
essential facts needed for a judgment, but is not richly supplied with 
connecting narrative facts.20 
Second, the idea of narrative relevance complicates some of the normative 
assumptions students of the jury often make when investigating the quality of 
jury performance.  For example, suppose one wished to study whether juries 
are biased by attention-getting or emotionally-arousing evidence.  A simple 
paradigm for such a study is to show one group of mock jurors bloody pictures 
of a decapitated corpse while the second group is only told that the victim’s 
head had been cut off.  If the first group were more prone to convict than the 
second, the natural conclusion would be that the pictures aroused the first 
group’s emotions and improperly influenced their judgment of the weight of 
the evidence.  After Old Chief, it is not as easy to make this normative 
 
 16. See W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE 
COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1981). 
 17. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The 
Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991). 
 18. Id. at 541-44. 
 19. Id. at 542. 
 20. Studies of testimony, however, indicate that irrelevant detail makes a witness’s relevant 
testimony appear more credible that it would appear without the detail.  See Brad Bell & 
Elizabeth Loftus, Trivial Persuasion in the Courtroom: The Power of (a Few) Minor Details, 56 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 669 (1989). 
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conclusion.  In light of Justice Souter’s analysis, it seems possible that the jury 
that saw the pictures was more interested in the case as a whole, or better 
appreciated the coherence of the prosecution’s story, and, therefore, reached 
the better decision.  Our empirical research has left us with a further empirical 
question; one that requires us to look at process rather than at outcome in 
assessing how well juries have performed.  Moreover, even when one has 
access to process, it may not be easy to determine the effects of narratively 
relevant evidence on the quality of jury decisions.  If, for example, jurors in the 
bloody picture condition argue more passionately for conviction, or conversely 
easily reach a decision to convict without substantial argument, have they done 
a better job than jurors in the witness condition who fail to convict because the 
only passionate juror argues for acquittal or because they differ so much 
among themselves that they cannot reach a decision?  It could be that the latter 
jurors have performed worse because they do not care as much about “getting 
it right.” 
A third area to which Justice Souter calls our attention concerns the 
implications of gaps in stories.21  Again, Judge Souter’s analysis raises a 
wealth of empirical questions, and we know little about most of them.  What, 
for example, constitutes a significant story gap?  Is Justice Souter right in his 
suggestion that a jury will see a gap or feel cheated when an essential fact that 
could be proved in a dramatic and potentially prejudicial fashion is instead 
proved by stipulation?  Will the quality of jury deliberations differ depending 
on whether facts are proved by evidence or established by stipulation, and if 
so, how?  It is not at all clear that the quality of jury deliberations will be 
affected by the jurors’ sense that there is a gap in what has been provided 
them.  Jurors may understand that proof in courts of law has special 
characteristics which caution against making inferences from how evidence is 
presented, and they may be able to rely on the evidence that they have heard, 
rather than drawing inferences from what they have not heard, so long as the 
evidence presented adequately supports a verdict. 
Justice Souter suggests that jurors have rather strong expectations 
regarding what evidence should be presented to prove certain issues, generated 
either by their personal experiences or by what the case they are hearing tells 
them about trial procedure.  He illustrates what he means with examples of 
jurors expecting that a gun will be introduced when a person is charged with 
firearm violence, and expecting that witnesses will be used to prove all the 
facts in a case because the first facts presented were proven in that manner.  It 
would be interesting to identify the expectations of proof jurors bring with 
them to the courtroom or acquire in the course of a trial, and their reactions 
when their expectations are disappointed.  There are, for example, anecdotes of 
 
 21. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 189. 
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jurors being influenced by what they have seen in actual or fictional televised 
trials.22  Some lawyers implicitly support Souter’s theory as they seek to play 
on jurors’ expectations to raise doubts if an opponent has not presented 
evidence stereotypically associated with her case.  Thus defense counsel in 
criminal cases often defend, in part, by emphasizing gaps in the state’s story, 
such as the absence of fingerprint evidence in a burglary prosecution or the 
state’s failure to produce the gun used in an assault.23  It is not clear, however, 
whether defenses that essentially call the jury’s attention to possible gaps in the 
other side’s presentation often succeed.  Generalizing from the transcripts and 
trial descriptions I have read, it often appears that when a defense in a real trial 
consists largely of pointing to gaps in an opponent’s story, it is because other 
evidence tending to make a case for the defendant is weak.  In a close case, 
however, gaps in expected stories may make a difference.  Again we have a 
topic for empirical investigation.  Although the literature includes reports of 
mock jury deliberations in which gaps in evidence have been brought up, the 
matter has not been systematically studied. 
There is, however, another side to the gap issue which calls into question 
the admission of narratively relevant evidence that Old Chief celebrates.  
Cognitive psychologists have shown that subjects who have been given a large 
portion of a schema or story and asked to recall what they were told, tend to fill 
in gaps in information in a manner that fits whatever the story led them to 
expect.  When quizzed, they will remember hearing story-consistent facts they 
were never told.24  It is possible that an engrossing, narratively rich trial story 
 
 22. Reid Hastie, for example, told me of a mock juror in one of his simulation studies who, 
“had been in a community theatre production of ‘Twelve Angry Men’ and who spouted speeches 
from the Henry Fonda role in our mock-jury deliberations and said, when we asked, that he had 
done it in real juries, too.”  [Personal communication from Professor Reid Hastie (Sept. 3, 1999)].  
In DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 481 (1991), the author adds: 
More than anything else, it’s the cathode-ray tube—not the prosecutor, not the defense 
attorney, certainly not the evidence—that gives a Baltimore juror his mindset . . . . Never 
mind that the trace lab rarely makes a case, a juror nonetheless wants to see hairs and 
fibers and shoe prints and every other shard of science gleaned from Hawaii Five-O 
reruns. 
 23. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 188. 
 24. See F.C. BARTLETT, REMEMBERING: A STUDY IN EXPERIMENTAL AND SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY (1932); G.H. Bower et al., Scripts in Memory for Text, 11 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 
177 (1979); J.D. Bransford et al., Sentence Memory: A Constructive Versus Interpretive 
Approach, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 193 (1972); A.C. Graesser et al., Constructing Inferences 
During Narrative Text Comprehension, 101 PSYCHOL. REV. 371 (1994); Nancy Pennington & 
Reid Hastie, Explanation-Based Decision Making: Effects of Memory Structure on Judgment, 14 
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 521 (1988).  Some 
psychologists, however, suggest that little gap filling occurs.  For a general review, see E. Tory 
Higgins & John A. Bargh, Social Cognition and Social Perception, 38 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 369 
(1987). 
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may foster similar tendencies.  Jurors who hear a large portion of a familiar 
story, but not its entirety, may recall story-consistent information that was not 
presented to them, or they may assume that such information exists.25  In 
addition, narratively rich information may produce an unduly strong tendency 
in jurors to credit story-consistent testimony or information even though it 
clashes with what, without the context of the story, would be more persuasive 
evidence.  In Old Chief, for example, if the jurors heard that Old Chief’s felony 
was a crime of violence, they might, on that account, have credited the 
testimony of an eyewitness who claimed to have seen Old Chief with a gun in 
his hand rather than what they otherwise might have found to be the more 
credible testimony: that of two eyewitnesses who swore Old Chief had no 
gun.26  So the best reason to exclude the evidence of the specific prior felony 
committed by Old Chief may not have been the possibility of prejudice in the 
sense of creating a pro–conviction bias, but, instead, because of the cognitive 
implications of this narratively rich evidence for a jury, that in good faith, is 
evaluating the probative value of the evidence that implicates or exonerates 
Old Chief.  Here, too, is an area that cries out for empirical investigation. 
In his discussion of narratively relevant evidence, Justice Souter assumes 
that such evidence would benefit the offeror’s case more than a stipulation 
would, and parties rejecting stipulations certainly make that assumption.  But is 
the assumption always correct?  Might not an uncontested stipulation that 
carries with it the judge’s imprimatur sometimes have greater weight than 
seemingly more vivid testimony which is questioned vigorously on cross-
examination?  We do not know.  Nor do we know whether narratively relevant 
evidence’s persuasive power stems from the virtues that Justice Souter recites, 
such as its attention-stimulating features and its elimination of gaps that 
confuse juries or leave them speculating about the implications of missing 
evidence and the motives of the party whom they think withheld it.  Evidence 
that would be inadmissible but for its narrative relevance may persuade juries 
for less palatable reasons: it may conduce to unwarranted gap filling or affect 
juries by exciting passions or prejudice.  Before Old Chief, it was generally 
assumed that parties who refused to accept stipulations to important facts did 
so because they sought to present less legally binding but more vivid proof of 
these facts; that is, proof that would influence juries for reasons other than the 
logical weight the evidence deserves.  After Old Chief, except in rare situations 
like that in the principal case, seeking to persuade by more than logic has the 
Supreme Court’s imprimatur.  Will this promote justice?  Is it what we want? 
 
 25. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 17, at 519. 
 26. See D. Michael Risinger, John Henry Wigmore, Johnny Lynn Old Chief, and 
“Legitimate Moral Force”: Keeping the Courtroom Safe for Heartstrings and Gore, 49 
HASTINGS L.J. 403, 447 (1998). 
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Another virtue of narrative relevance for Justice Souter is that colorful 
stories with descriptive richness can sustain the willingness of jurors to draw 
whatever inferences are necessary to reach an honest verdict.27  It is not clear 
why jurors would be unwilling to draw the inferences essential to reach honest 
verdicts with less colorful evidence or how narratively relevant evidence has 
the effect that Justice Souter posits.  Two possibilities come to mind.  The first 
is cognitive; mental work is required to draw inferences from facts.  Jurors 
exposed to richly descriptive evidence may be more motivated to do this work 
than jurors who have heard a more bare bones story, or they may have less 
work to do because the additional facts trigger scripts stored in their memories.  
But the converse is also possible.  It may take more cognitive work to focus on 
the facts needed to make necessary inferences when they are embedded in a 
captivating story or if they trigger a legally inappropriate script than when they 
are presented in starker fashion.  The second explanation is motivational. 
Evidence that involves a juror as a whole person may be needed to counteract 
jurors’ emotions in situations where they would otherwise be reluctant to draw 
valid inferences, such as the inference that a person who assists at a mercy 
killing has an intent to kill.  For example, Dr. Kevorkian’s conviction after four 
jury acquittals may have happened because the prosecution had a movie of the 
doctor actually killing a “patient” rather than just a description of what 
occurred.  But the verdict may also have been due to the trial court’s decision 
to bar Dr. Kevorkian from presenting evidence that was narratively relevant 
from his perspective: namely, evidence from the deceased’s close family 
members about the deceased’s condition and desires and their sense that what 
Dr. Kevorkian did was a blessing that brought peace to a loved one.  Finally, 
Dr. Kevorkian’s more active role in bringing about death in the killing for 
which he was convicted might have been critical—he had previously “merely” 
constructed lethal machines that a person wanting to die could trigger.  Perhaps 
even a colorless description of how Dr. Kevorkian had acted to bring about the 
death he was tried for would also have resulted in a conviction.  In Justice 
Souter’s speculations there are rich possibilities for empirical investigation.  
Unless and until the possibilities he posits are affirmed empirically, they 
should be treated as speculations.  The Supreme Court issues binding 
statements of law, but no matter how authoritative these statements are in 
determining the law and no matter how much the logic of the legal ruling 
depends on the Justices’ views of facts, facts do not exist because the Justices 
believe them. 
The law of evidence and the behavior of juries have been persistent themes 
in the teaching and research that I have done throughout my career.  Old Chief 
brings them together in ways I find fascinating.  As an evidence case, it 
 
 27. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 187. 
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recognizes limits to the judge’s discretion under FRE 403 when evidence, 
despite its prejudicial potential, is unlikely to raise strong emotions, as well as 
the existence of rare cases where exclusion is mandated.  It also departs from 
the literal readings of the Federal Rules that dominate most of the Supreme 
Court’s recent rulings interpreting these rules. Instead, the Court recognizes a 
new aspect of relevance that relates more to the actual persuasiveness of 
evidence than to its abstract tendency to make a fact in issue more or less likely 
than it would be without the evidence.  As a case on the role of the jury, Old 
Chief presents a different image of the jury from the view that commonly 
seems to motivate Supreme Court decisions.  It calls into question what 
seemed before Old Chief to be well-established norms regarding the 
appropriate influence of different kinds of evidence on jurors.  Finally, the Old 
Chief Court places its imprimatur on the story model of jury decision-making, 
and in doing so suggests new questions for empirical research on juries and 
gives a new urgency to further research on old questions.  Few cases in recent 
memory have raised more intriguing questions about how juries respond to 
evidence. 
 
